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1 An Introduction to Equity Act 1873, which stated that Equity, as a body of law, could be applied in any Division of the High Court. The effect of this was that remedies that derived from Common Law or Equity could be awarded, regardless of the court in which the claim was heard. 22 The Judicature Acts are highly significant in English legal history, but their significance must not be exaggerated. The effect of this legislation was to fuse the administration of Common Law and Equity, but the statutes did not fuse the two bodies of law. 23 Equity was not abolished by the Judicature Acts. Indeed, the Judicature Act 1873 recognized that Equity prevailed where there was a conflict or variance between the rules of Common Law and Equity. 24 One of the most important applications of this principle occurred almost a decade later in Walsh v Lonsdale. 25 In this case, a lease was purported to be made, but it was unenforceable at Common Law because the formalities for its creation were never completed. Since, however, the parties had agreed to enter into a lease, Equity was able to enforce the agreement and treat the lease as having been validly made. In other words, the flexibility of Equity was able to make the agreement work despite the failure to comply with the requirements of the Common Law. Equity is still sometimes described as operating to modify the rigidity of the Common Law. As Lord Briggs recently recognized in Guest v Guest : 26 One of the principal functions of equity is to put right injustice to which the law is other wise blind, by restraining the rigid application of legal rules where their implementation would be unconscionable. But, to the extent that this indicates that Equity is vague and unprincipled, it is untrue: much of Equity today is rule-based and certain; precedent is followed and there are iden tifiable principles. Lord Leggatt has summarized this well in Guest v Guest : 27 Although equity jurisdiction was originally administered according to the conscience of the Chancellor, that long ago ceased to be the case and modern equity is governed by prin ciple just as much as the law in general. As Harman LJ said in Campbell Discount Co Ltd v Bridge [ 28 ]: ‘Since the time of Lord Eldon the system of equity for good or evil has been a very precise one, and equitable jurisdiction is exercised only on well-known principles.’ Further, the characterization of the Common Law as being rigid and unyielding in the face of injustice is unconvincing, since the rapid advances of the Common Law during the twentieth century and continuing into the twenty-first century in, for example, the laws of negligence and unjust enrichment, show that it is creative and nuanced. Today, rather than seeing the Common Law and Equity as being in conflict, the better characterization is that they are complementary, working together, although sometimes (and unfortunately) contradicting each other. © Oxford University Press

1.4 THE CONTEMPORARY CONTRIBUTION OF EQUITY TO ENGLISH LAW

It is all very well to identify a body of judge-made law, give it a name, identify certain vague characteristics, and then seek to justify this by reference to constitutional, politi cal, and legal developments many hundreds of years ago. The crucial question is whether

22 See now the Senior Courts Act 1981, s. 49(2). 23 Evershed, ‘Reflections on the Fusion of Law and Equity after Seventy-Five Years’ (1954) 70 LQR 326, 341. 24 Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873, s. 25(11). See now the Senior Courts Act 1981, s. 49(1). 25 (1882) 21 Ch D 9. 26 [2022] UKSC 27, [2022] 3 WLR 911 [4]. 27 Ibid., [161]. 28 [1961] 1 QB 455, 459. © Oxford University Press