Blick_UK Politics (9780198825555)_CH10

244 Chapter 10  Identity, equality, and power

in Parliament and in closed environments such as the Cabinet , and through negotiations between the UK and the EU. Another way of defining the Brexit supporting group is in terms of the values that bound it together, rather than its socio-economic composition. Dislike of what might be termed manifestations of identity politics tended to a good predicter of support for ‘leave’. Peo- ple who defined themselves as unfavourable towards feminism, multiculturalism, and social liberalism were far more likely to be ‘leave’ in alignment than remain (74 per cent; 81 per cent; and 80 per cent respective- ly). Alongside this rejection of some identity-related movements, supporters of Brexit were more likely than ■  The UK as a society is characterized by diversity in various forms. People are different, with different char- acteristics, which can be defined in a number of ways: including by gender, sexual orientation, ethnicity, age, whether or not they have disabilities, and religious af- filiation or lack of attachment to a faith. Some of these characteristics are protected under the Equality Act 2010, meaning that discrimination against people for belonging to these groups is unlawful. ■  These characteristics are often grouped under the heading ‘identity’. The term ‘identity politics’ broadly applies to the effort to assert the rights and interests of particular groups. Identity of this type has become an important factor in UK politics. For instance, it is a means of assessing the legitimacy of public institu- tions. Some observers scrutinize bodies such as the House of Commons or the Civil Service on the basis of the diversity of their composition; and political institu- tions themselves, such as parties, may seek to ensure that they become more reflective of the makeup of society. ■  How far these various efforts work to protect and promote diversity is open to question. Hate crime, for instance, is a persistent problem in UK society. Laws in themselves are not sufficient to prevent discrimina- tion and harassment in the workplace and elsewhere. There is greater diversity than was once the case in places such as the House of Commons, but still signifi- cant underrepresentation elsewhere. Summary

advocates of remain to be attached to a particular iden- tity of their own. In England, Brexit supporters were sig- nificantly more likely than ‘remain’ voters to describe themselves as ‘more English than British’, or ‘English not British’ (39 per cent of ‘leave’ voters to 18 per cent of ‘remain’ used one of these labels). Elsewhere in the UK, identity could point in the other direction. Those who voted ‘remain’ were more likely to identify either as being Scottish rather than British, or more Scottish than British than backers of ‘leave’ (by 55 per cent to 46 per cent). There was, therefore, some connection between a strong sense of Englishness and wanting Brexit; and between a sense of Scottishness and fa- vouring remain (Lord Ashcroft, 2019). ■  An aspect of social diversity that was a subject of attention before the rise of interest in identity politics is socio-economic, involving matters such as class or grade, and the distribution of material wealth (which also has a territorial dimension). Differing levels of par- ticipation and of allocation of opportunity connected to these characteristics arguably have implications for the inclusiveness and equality of the political system. This issue continues to be pertinent today. ■  Identity and socio-economic diversity are connect- ed to power. There may be significant barriers to some marginalized groups being able to pursue their inter- ests through the political system or achieving what is sometimes known as ‘substantive representation’. Yet it is possible for a member of the public who has not pre- viously engaged in such activities to launch a success- ful campaign, as happened with upskirting legislation.

■  Voting patterns in the EU referendum showed cer- tain correlations between identity and voting. BAME people, for instance, were far more likely than voters overall to support ‘remain’. Members of ‘higher’ so- cial grades tended towards ‘remain’, while those from ‘lower’ social grades were more inclined to ‘leave’. In this sense, we might see the referendum as a vehicle for the more marginalized to achieve a political objec- tive—even if the outcome might be contrary to their own material objectives. A characteristic of ‘leave’ vot- ers generally was their dislike of some aspects of what might be termed identity politics. © Oxford University Press