Blick_UK Politics (9780198825555)_CH10

10.3 In theory 243

influence than they might otherwise do. Other groups in society—in particular those in positions of socio- economic privilege—can achieve more power relative to others than their numbers merit. It can be easier for them to overcome barriers to political organization that might prevent others from forming movements. Such groups—that may include commercial interests—can achieve influence over policy makers of a sort that is not open to others.

Question the question Politics and equality are expansive and complex con - cepts. There are many competing versions of what each means at any given point; and they change over time. Therefore, the idea of achieving full political equality in a way that achieves universal acceptance is not realistic. It is perhaps better to conceive the project as an aspiration that requires continual effort and adjustment to chang - ing circumstances.

Brexit, identity, equality, and power

The relationship with its European continent has been crucial to the formation of identity in the UK. It has a shared cultural heritage with other European states—in- volving features such as religious belief, culture, and po- litical developments—stretching back over thousands of years. Common features and cooperation have been important; and so has antagonism. While the UK may be part of a common European historical continuum, another part of its identity has been tension with oth- er European states, in particular France. While certain events—such as the Second World War—may have en- couraged for some a sense of separate identity from the European mainland, similarities continued. The UK and other European states—often as a consequence of im- perial legacies—moved together towards the status of multicultural societies. Arguments about how far the UK should engage with its continent are themselves a long- standing part of identity in the UK, of which the Brexit experience has been a manifestation (Simms, 2016). Identity was significant to the referendum itself. There were notable patterns of connection between personal characteristics and the way people voted. According to polling conducted at the time of the referendum, for in- stance, 73 per cent of those who described themselves as black were ‘remain’ voters, while 67 per cent of peo- ple classifying themselves as Asian voted ‘remain’. Of Muslims, 70 per cent voted ‘remain’. By contrast, 58 per cent of respondents who referred to themselves as ‘Christians’ were ‘leave’ voters. There were also links between the socio-economic position of a person and the way they were likely to vote in the referendum. For example, the AB group were 57 per cent ‘remain’, while C2DEs were 64 per cent ‘leave’ (see Table 10.1 for defi- nitions of social grades in the UK). ‘Leave’ voters, when asked about their perceived future economic pros- pects, were more pessimistic than those who backed ‘remain’ (Lord Ashcroft, 2019). Some evidence has sug- gested that any negative economic consequences of

leaving the EU could impact disproportionately upon the worse off (BBC News, 2018). Predictions of this kind are impossible to make with certainty, but this prospect has given rise to debate about the supposed phenom- enon of people supporting courses of action contrary to their own material interests (Younge, 2018). In some respects, the Brexit episode suggested that less privileged social groups could wield pow- er, though this tendency did not apply if measured by factors such as ethnicity. The data cited above on voting patterns offer some support for this view. Less skilled workers and the economically inactive leant towards Brexit, and through the referendum achieved this outcome. Among people who were eligible to vote in the previous, 2015, General Election, but did not do so, 58 per cent voted leave (Skinner, 2016). In other words, some of those who were to some extent politically excluded tended towards Brexit, and were able on this occasion to take part and achieve what they wanted. A variety of more privileged groups— including parliamentarians—who we might general- ly expect to wield power out of proportion to their numbers ultimately felt compelled to implement a policy a majority of them opposed. Various business groups were also opposed to Brexit but did not man- age to prevent it. They struggled even in their efforts to secure the least disruptive departure possible and the maximization of continuity. From this point of view, one might argue that the EU referendum was an example of democracy in action, and proof that it could work. An outcome that the marginalized were more likely to favour came about. Yet, as discussed in Chapter 8, the extent to which referendums—includ- ing the 2016 EU referendum—are genuine exercises of the popular will is a matter of controversy, and—as Chapter 8 shows—some critics regard these devices as vulnerable to elite manipulation. Precise decisions about how to implement the ‘leave’ result took place

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